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NOTES
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COURIERS: A
CHALLENGE TO THE WEST GERMANY
POSTAL MONOPOLY AND EEC LAW*
INTRODUCTION
Private international couriers' (couriers) have developed in the
last fifteen years to accommodate the needs of the changing business
world. Couriers offer overnight express service allowing door-to-door
delivery of documents across national and international boundaries.
Although national postal authorities have simultaneously improved
their mail service, couriers meet a demand that government agencies-
whose services are limited to national boundaries-cannot fulfill.
West Germany has been among the countries that have chal-
lenged the establishment of the courier industry as an intrusion upon
existing national postal monopolies. The law of West Germany auth-
orizes the federal government to operate a postal monopoly.2 The
monopoly reserves the right to forward written correspondence and
* In the summer of 1984, the Author worked at the law firm of Rossbach & Kirchner
in Frankfurt, West Germany. Research done during that summer inspired the topic of this
Note. The Author benefited greatly from meeting those who are involved in the
controversy in West Germany and is indebted to James I. Campbell, Jr. and Ralf Wojtek,
whose expertise has been a major force in shaping postal monopoly law. The Author
expresses her special gratitude to Johann-Andreas Rossbach.
1. This term refers to private corporations that provide international express delivery
service for various types of documents. Airborne, DHL-Worldwide, Emory, and Federal
Express are examples of private international couriers. The industry has grown tremen-
dously since the first private international couriers began operating in 1970. Couriers now
carry an average of 10 million pieces per year to produce a market value of approximately
$4 billion dollars. E. KAUFER, DIE BEDEUTUNG INTERNATIONALER KURIERDIENSTE IM
INTERNATIONALEN HANDEL 5 (1985).
2. In pertinent part, section 2 of the Postal Law states:
(1) The establishment and operation of facilities for commercial forwarding of
shipments containing written correspondence or other communications from
person to person is reserved exclusively to the German Federal Postal Service.
(2) "Forwarding" as used in (1) above includes all tasks relating to collecting,
transmitting, or delivery to the receiver.
(3) "Communications" used in the sense of (1) is not to be so regarded if it is
1. a communication that is attached to and related exclusively to another ship-
ment; or
2. returned printed matter.
(4) The Bundesminister for Postal and Telecommunications, or those under his
authority, may grant an exemption from the postal monopoly in special cases.
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other person-to-person communications exclusively to the West Ger-
man Federal Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications
(Bundespost).3
Recently, the West German government addressed the relation-
ship of private international couriers and the postal monopoly. Couri-
ers4 and the Bundespost entered into an agreement (the November
Agreement) that exempts private international couriers from the pos-
tal monopoly. 5 The exemption is based on the unique administrative
advantages that allow couriers to guarantee fast, reliable, door-to-door
delivery under the supervision of a single entity.6
The November Agreement reflects a reversal of the Bundespost's
position. Under a previous arrangement known as the February
Agreement, the Bundespost contended that its monopoly extended to
all routes where its service was "as fast and as reliable" as that of the
private international couriers.7 The February Agreement was unac-
ceptable to the couriers because it failed to define their status clearly:
the phrase "as fast and as reliable" in the February Agreement made
the couriers' legal right to operate subject to the development and
expertise of Datapost, the Bundespost's own express service. The
November Agreement, by contrast, defines a sphere of activity within
which the couriers may operate regardless of how efficient the govern-
ment's service becomes.
This Note will demonstrate that the effect of the November
Agreement is consistent with West German law and the law of the
European Economic Community (EEC). Because the November
Agreement is non-binding, the significant issue is not whether the
Agreement itself is consistent with West German law and EEC law,
but whether the new status quo of the parties established by the Agree-
ment is acceptable under both legal regimes.
Section I traces the development of the courier industry and pos-
tal service and presents the traditional justifications for a national pos-
tal monopoly. Section I also describes the parties and the previous
status quo established by the February Agreement. Section I con-
The exemption may be based on conditions or fees, especially the required
payment of an appropriate one-time or continual lost-revenue fee.
Gesetz iiber das Postwesen [PostG] § 2, 1969 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 1006 (W. Ger.).
3. PostG § 2(1).
4. The couriers have banded together in an organization called the Bundesverband
Internationaler Kurierdienste (BIK) (National Association of Courier Services). BIK
members contribute proportional shares toward fees for legal counsel.
5. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 54 (private international couriers transport messages across national
borders without surrendering control to another agency); see also infra notes 32-40 and
accompanying text (discussing differences between postal and courier operations).
7. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
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cludes by discussing the defects in the February Agreement and set-
ting out the terms of the November Agreement. Section II identifies
the legal provisions under West German and EEC law that are rele-
vant to the scope of the postal monopoly as it is affected by the
November Agreement. Section III establishes the non-binding nature
of the Agreement and analyzes the new status quo achieved by the
Agreement under both West German and EEC law. Section III then
addresses future applications of the Agreement. The Note concludes
that the November Agreement's effects, or the new status quo, com-
port with both West German and EEC law.
I. BACKGROUND
The notion of a monopoly is contrary to the concept of a free
market economy, and states that advocate a competitive market struc-
ture tolerate monopolies only to the extent that the monopoly serves
an overriding state interest." West Germany, both as an independent
sovereign and as a member of the European Economic Community, is
committed to a free market economy. 9 As a general proposition,
therefore, West Germany's monopoly should be narrowly construed.
Whether courier services should be included within the scope of the
postal monopoly depends on whether ordinary postal services and
courier services are distinguishable.
A. HISToRICAL DEVELOPMENT
Couriers and postal services developed in response to two distinct
demands. From earliest times, governments, merchants, and private
individuals employed couriers to deliver messages of special impor-
tance.10 Until literacy spread throughout the general population,
however, this demand was confined primarily to governments. Gov-
ernmental bodies employed their own couriers when a special need for
8. W. FRIEDRICH, RECHTSKUNDE FOR JEDERMANN 322 (1984).
9. See generally id. at 332-42; H. COING, EPOCHEN DER RECHTSGESCHICHTE IN
DEUTSCHLAND 110-22 (1981); G. K6BLER, RECHTSGESCHICHTE 246-49 (1982). These
authors all emphasize the care West Germany has taken to avoid concentrations of power
in the aftermath of the Nazi regime. While tolerant of some state intervention for social
purposes, the West German economy is based on the concept of a free market and relies on
the responsible conduct of market participants. H. COING, supra, at 118. West Germany
furthered this commitment to the principles of the free market by entering the European
Economic Community in 1957. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
10. The earliest historical records contain evidence of postal systems. Among others,
the Twelfth Pharaonic Dynasty in Egypt (circa 2000 B.C.), the Chou Dynasty in China
(1122-225 B.C.), and the Roman Empire all employed couriers in the administration of
their governments. See generally G.A. CODDING, JR., THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION 2-
18 (1964) (origins of the post); P. BADURA, DAS VERWALTUNGSMONOPOL 193-209 (1963)
(history and nature of the German postal monopoly).
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reliability or speed arose."1
With the discovery of the printing press, the rise of universities,
and the expansion of commerce, the average citizen had more occasion
for written correspondence.12 As business and personal acquaintances
grew, so did the demand for reliable and affordable means of trans-
porting written messages. The postal service developed in response to
that demand.13 Rather than cater to customers with special needs,
postal services provided standard mail service to the general public.
Even governmental bodies began to use the postal service, which pro-
vided reliable delivery at much more affordable prices, when there was
no special need for fast or confidential delivery.14
The postal monopoly developed in response to the increasing
number of written communications. As the volume of non-govern-
mental correspondence grew, so did the concern of governments that
such communications could threaten their security.15 By forcing all
persons to use government-employed couriers, states hoped to control
possible leaks of confidential information.' 6 The first postal monopo-
lies were thus a form of censorship. The continued expansion of stan-
dard mail communications also identified the postal service as a
possible revenue-producer, lending further support to the idea of a
state-run monopoly. "7 The concept of a state obligation to provide
postal service developed even later as a justification for a postal
monopoly.18
11. The Roman Empire, for example, developed an intricate messenger system to coor-
dinate military actions. See G.A. CODDING, JR., supra note 10, at 2-3. More generally,
governments employed couriers to inform themselves of world developments and current
events. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Delivery time was a consideration during the early development of postal services,
but it was less of a concern than affordability. With respect to delivery time, the main
concern was simply that couriers use some means of transportation other than walking. Id.
at 10-11.
14. Id. at 7-18.
15. See G.A. CODDING, JR., supra note 10, at 6; P. BADURA, supra note 10, at 64;
Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in the United States, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 33, 35
(1975).
16. See G.A. CODDING, JR., supra note 10, at 6; Priest, supra note 15, at 35.
17. See generally HousE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 93D CONG.,
1sT SEss., STATUTES RESTRICTING PRIVATE CARRIAGE OF MAIL AND THEIR ADMINIS-
TRATION 56 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as BOARD OF GOVERNORS REP.]. As
part of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, the U.S. Congress directed the Board of
Governors of the Postal Service to do a complete evaluation of the Private Express Statutes
and to make recommendations for their modernization. As part of that study, the Board of
Governors briefly reviewed the history of the statutes, id. at 55-62, discussed postal monop-
olies in other countries, id. at 63-68, and considered the impact of courier services on the
postal service, id. at 83-86.
18. The concept of a state obligation to provide a postal service required two prior
developments: first, that people see themselves as citizens of a nation-state and look to that
state as the provider of certain rights, and second, that the service be available to a large
enough percentage of the population so that people identified the service as a public func-
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COURIERS
Once a standard postal service was in place that satisfied the
demands of the general population, the need for special messengers
was insufficient to spur development in the courier industry. The need
for couriers did not disappear; it simply was not in great demand
where communications operated on a local or regional scale. The
modem business world, however, with its emphasis on international
trade, has revitalized the need for international couriers. 19 The impor-
tance of moving time-sensitive documents20 across national borders
has put a premium on courier services with the flexibility and competi-
tive incentive to oversee transport from pick-up to delivery.2' The
development of courier services that are independent of the standard
postal service, however, has created confusion as to whether courier
services fall under the scope of existing postal monopolies. The
November Agreement represents an effort to define the relationship
between couriers and the state postal monopoly.
B. FACTORS LEADING TO THE NOVEMBER AGREEMENT
To analyze the November Agreement, it is important to under-
stand the parties involved and the deficiencies of the previous Febru-
ary Agreement.
1. The Parties
The primary parties to the November Agreement are the
Bundespost and private international couriers.22 Datapost, the
Bundespost's express courier service, operates under the Bundespost's
supervision and also plays an important role in the controversy.
The West German Bundespost is a federal administrative agency
tion. This development did not occur until Sir Roland Hill's innovations in the 1840's
reformed the English postal service and affected postal service worldwide. See G.A. COD-
DING, JR., supra note 10, at 7-11.
19. See Foster, Air Express: A Service For All Seasons, 70 A.B.A. J. 63 passim (1984).
20. The exact definition of "time-sensitive document" may vary from country to coun-
try. The United States Postal Service (USPS), for example, has defined an "extremely
urgent exception" to its postal monopoly by stating that the Private Express Statutes, 39
U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1980), do not apply if "delivery must be completed within 12 hours or
by noon of the addressee's next business day. The suspension is available only if the value
or usefulness of the letter would be lost or greatly diminished if it is not delivered within
these time limits." 39 C.F.R. § 320.6(b)(1) (1985).
21. Couriers serve a variety of businesses. Banks send checks and other monetary
instruments by courier to take advantage of the most favorable interest rates. Transporta-
tion companies forward shipping documents, including bills of lading, by courier to avoid
delays at customs. Engineering and construction firms manage projects in remote areas by
exchanging bids, drawings, and parts between home offices and field offices via courier. E.
KAuFER, supra note 1, at 18. Lawyers, willing to spend extra money to guarantee the fast
delivery of briefs, contracts, and other documents, constitute a large section of the couriers'
clientele.
22. The November Agreement consists of an exchange of letters between the
Bundespost and the couriers. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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charged with serving the interests of the general public. 23 The Postal
Law confers upon the Bundespost the exclusive right to forward
written communications. 24 The most important function of the
Bundespost is to provide standard mail service throughout West
Germany.25
The Bundespost has supplemented its standard mail service by
the creation of Datapost. Datapost offers international express mail
service to private individuals and to the government. 26 The 1982 stat-
ute that created Datapost 27 specifically provided that the Bundespost
transport Datapost items "together with other postal administra-
tions."' 28 As a division of a governmental agency, Datapost has exclu-
sive competence only over operations that are within national
boundaries. Consequently, Datapost must rely on the cooperation of
foreign postal administrations to deliver express mail across national
borders.29 Foreign postal services may promise to cooperate with
West Germany's Datapost through international agreements; 30 how-
ever, reliance on international agreements has inherent structural
problems: a document comes under the domain of at least two sover-
23. P. BADuRA, supra note 10, at 199.
24. PostG § 2. The Postal Law also guarantees postal privacy, id. § 5, limits the liabil-
ity of the Bundespost, id. § 11, and sets out the procedures for dispute resolutions, id. § 26.
25. P. BADURA, supra note 10, at 199. Similarly, the policy of the USPS is set out as
follows:
The Postal Service shall have as its basic function the obligation to provide postal
services to bind the Nation together through the personal, educational, literary,
and business correspondence of the people. It shall provide prompt, reliable, and
efficient services to patrons in all areas and shall render postal services to all com-
munities.
39 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1982).
26. Datapost began service on January 1, 1983. Promotional efforts included a
brochure entitled "Datapost: The International Postal Courier Service." The brochure
states that Datapost "guarantees" delivery within the specified time; however, delivery time
for many countries is specific only within a range of days, e.g., one to three days for deliv-
ery in the U.S., two to four days for Australia, one to two days for Great Britain and
France.
27. Verordnung fiber den Datapostdienst Ausland [Datapost-Verordnung], 1982 BGBI
1 1616 (W. Ger.).
28. Id.
29. Id
30. See, e.g., Universal Postal Union Convention, July 5, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 345, T.I.A.S.
No. 8231. The Universal Postal Union (U.P.U.), under the terms of the Universal Postal
Union Convention, regulates international mail between signatories. 27 U.S.T. 345, 375.
See also International Express Mail/Datapost Agreement, Dec.15, 1978-Jan. 22, 1979,
United States-West Germany, 30 U.S.T. 3789, T.I.A.S. No. 9426. The International
Express Mail/Datapost Agreement predates the 1982 Datapost-Verordnung that created
Datapost. The Datapost-Verordnung, however, superseded another regulation creating a
foreign express mail delivery service in October of 1978. Datapost-Verordnung § 13(2).
Presumably, since the United States and West Germany have not modified their Interna-
tional Express Mail/Datapost Agreement, the 1982 Datapost replaced the earlier Datapost
for purposes of that Agreement.
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eign states, and administrative details create delays.31
By contrast to Datapost, private international couriers operate
independently of the government. Couriers, able to focus on the
demand for fast, reliable delivery of time-sensitive documents,32 pro-
vide delivery across international borders while maintaining exclusive
control of the document.33 The typical private international courier,
unlike Datapost, establishes a network of centers throughout the
world to facilitate the direct transfer of a document from one location
to another.34 Although more than one person may handle the docu-
ment during transport, the document always remains within the con-
trol of a single courier company.35 If a document is lost, the private
courier can trace it wholly by reference to its internal records; 36 in the
event of irrecoverable loss, the courier company is directly liable to the
sender.37 Private international couriers offer pick-up and delivery
times tailored to business needs, 38 and the couriers guarantee delivery
3 1. The Universal Postal Union Convention distinguishes between the country of ori-
gin and the country of destination of a posted document. E.g., Universal Postal Union
Convention, supra note 30, art. 5 (defining ownership of postal items during course of
transit); id., art. 23 (country of destination may impose storage charge); id., art. 30 (specify-
ing conditions under which sender may withdraw an item from the post; conditions depend
upon whether item is in country of origin or country of destination). Further, the Conven-
tion specifies at which points each nation's law governs. With respect to express items, for
example, article 29 of the Convention provides that if the administration of the country of
destination offers the service, a letter may be delivered "by special messenger as soon as
possible after arrival at the delivery office." Id., art. 29(1). Special demands are governed
by the country of destination. Id., art. 29(3). In a provision that clearly demonstrates a
difference between the postal service and private international couriers, the postal adminis-
tration in the country of destination is only required to make one attempt at express deliv-
ery. If that attempt fails, the country of destination may treat the item as ordinary mail.
Id., art. 29(5).
The Universal Postal Union Convention also has liability provisions which differ in
important respects from those of a private international courier. The postal administration
is only liable for the loss of registered items, id., art. 44, and may even be entitled to repay-
ment from the sender or addressee if the item is later found and delivered, id., art. 50.
These concepts are contrary to the principles of liability guaranteed by private international
couriers who pay for documents that arrive late as well as for lost documents. See, eg.,
Federal Express Service Guide 194, 201 (Oct. 1984).
32. See Foster, supra note 19, passim.
33. See, eg., Federal Express Service Guide, supra note 31, at 1 ("No multiple carriers
or interline shipments with Federal Express to any of our direct service points. Our own
couriers, vans, aircraft and hub means your package never leaves our hands until it is
delivered.").
34. See, eg., id. at 191-205 (international service conditions).
35. Id. at 165.
36. Tracing procedures for postal service items, on the other hand, involve cooperation
by at least two postal administrations. See supra note 31.
37. For most couriers, liability is limited by terms made known to the consumer prior
to carriage. Federal Express, for example, limits its liability for any shipment from the
United States to Europe to $100.00, with a maximum of $500.00 for items of extraordinary
value. Federal Express Service Guide, supra note 31, at 197.
38. Id. at 200-01. Private couriers often provide Saturday service. Some postal serv-
ices, on the other hand, have terminated Saturday service or otherwise reduced the fre-
quency of pick-up and delivery when cost-saving measures have been necessary. See, e.g.,
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within a specified time.39 The price for this specialized service is a
high fee which only an actual time-sensitive document can justify.4°
By early 1984, private international couriers and Datapost were
both operating in West Germany, despite the existence of West Ger-
many's postal monopoly.41 In February of 1984, representatives of the
couriers and the Bundespost met to discuss the relationship between
the couriers and the state postal monopoly.
2. The February Agreement
The February Agreement comprised an exchange of letters
between the couriers and the Bundespost. 42 The Bundespost's letter to
the couriers stated the government's position: the postal monopoly
was in effect on all routes where the service provided by Datapost was
"as fast and as reliable" as courier services. 43 The letter also outlined
measures designed to make Datapost more efficient and, thus, compet-
itive with the courier industry.44 The effect of the February Agree-
ment was to allow couriers to continue operating only on routes where
E. KAUFER, supra note 1, at 29 (describing the West German Bundespost's curtailment of
Saturday service and less frequent pick-ups from letter boxes).
39. Federal Express Service Guide, supra note 31, at 208-13. Even if a private courier
relies on commercial flights, the courier can incorporate the estimated times into its guar-
antee. There is, however, no need for couriers to allow for possible inefficiencies in another
nation's postal administration.
40. For a sample rate schedule for a private international courier, see id. at 166, 171,
175. The rate schedule for Datapost is published in the Auslandspostgebiihrenordnung,
1981 BGBI 11070 (W. Ger.) (schedule for outgoing foreign mall). Fees for International
Express Mail, the USPS equivalent of Datapost, are published in the International Mail
Manual, which is incorporated by reference in the Federal Register. See 39 C.F.R. § 10.1
(1984).
41. See supra note 26. Datapost entered a market that was already well established.
See E. KAUFER, supra note 1, at 5.
42. Letter from the Bundesminister ftir das Post- und Fernmeldewesen to BIK Legal
Counsel (Feb. 21, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Bundespost Letter of Feb. 21, 1984]. BIK
denotes the National Association of Courier Services. See supra note 4.
43. The government described its position as follows:
The German Postal Service will not enforce the postal monopoly against private
couriers with respect to international messages, if, within certain limits, the
Bundespost cannot provide service that is as fast and as reliable. A fast and relia-
ble postal service is, however, offered in the Datapost service of the Bundespost.
Bundespost Letter of Feb. 21, 1984.
44. Three specific measures were cited:
[(1)] The Bundespost will accept Datapost communications, even when the sender
ships irregularly according to need, without application or permit procedures.
[(2)] Regular pick-ups of Datapost communications can be arranged for a fixed
price of 14 DM, regardless of the distance between the location of the sender and
the designated drop-off spot within the city limits.
[(3)] Datapost International operates at present with 31 countries of the world,
and will shortly operate with 33 when Malaysia and Cyprus are added. ...
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Datapost could not offer comparable service.45 The Agreement, how-
ever, gave the couriers formal notice that the monopoly would be
enforced and courier service would be eliminated on routes where
Datapost was able to compete with the couriers in terms of speed and
reliability.
The February Agreement had several flaws. First, the non-bind-
ing nature of the Agreement4 6 left the future status of the couriers
unsettled; the Agreement neither officially exempted couriers from the
postal monopoly nor officially prohibited their operation. West Ger-
many's refusal to take a firm stance on private couriers was also at
odds with the many countries that had committed themselves to a defi-
nite position. 47 Second, this uncertainty created immediate opera-
tional disadvantages for the couriers; in particular, the uncertainty
made it difficult for the couriers to accurately represent the status of
Datapost in their advertising.48 Furthermore, the possibility that
Datapost might force the couriers out of business in the future
deterred the couriers from investing money, time, and creative energy
to improve their efficiency.
Finally, the timing of the Bundespost's entry into the interna-
tional courier market violated the fundamental principles of a market
economy. If the Bundespost maintained that the operation of private
international couriers violated the postal monopoly, then the
Bundespost should have objected to the couriers at the first signs of
activity in the private sector. By delaying its entry into the interna-
45. The February Agreement did not expressly provide an exemption as authorized in
the Postal Law. See PostG § 2(4). The conclusion that the couriers were exempt from the
monopoly where Datapost was not as fast and reliable was, however, implied in the mean-
ing of the Agreement.
46. The Bundespost Letter of Feb. 21, 1984, supra note 42, was merely an opinion
letter of the Bundesminister for Post- and Telecommunications. The letter would be
equivalent to similar non-binding opinion letters that agencies in the U.S. issue: they are
evidence of the law, not substantive law itself. Similarly, the November Agreement is also
non-binding. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
47. Countries have taken various approaches to the courier industry. The U.S. has
expressly exempted private couriers from its Private Express Statutes via the "extremely
urgent exception." See supra note 20. Canada and the United Kingdom both exempt pri-
vate couriers upon payment of a set fee that exceeds normal postal rates. See Postal Privi-
lege Suspension Order § 2(2), 1981 STAT. INST. 1483 (U.K.); 1981 CAN. STAT. 0. & REG.
82-35, reprinted in 116 Can. Gaz. 119, 165 (Jan. 13, 1982) (Can.). The November Agree-
ment between the West German Bundespost and the couriers left France as the only EEC
member that expressly forbids private courier operations, although France has made nar-
row exceptions for restricted service. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [FAZ], Dec. 20,
1984, at 14, col. 1.
48. The concluding paragraph of the February Agreement warned that the couriers
were required to state the Bundespost's legal position accurately in their advertising.
Bundespost Letter of Feb. 21, 1984, supra note 42. Since the Agreement would have gradu-
ally expanded the monopoly's scope as Datapost service improved, see supra text accompa-
nying note 7, the Agreement, in effect, required couriers to speculate as to Datapost's speed
and reliability and to present that status accurately in advertising.
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tional courier business, however, the Bundespost severely undercut the
private couriers' potential to recover the developmental costs incurred
at the initial, inefficient stages of operation.49
It is a perversion of competitive market principles for a public
entity to sit back and watch as private industry makes innovations in
the free market and invests huge amounts of money in development,
then to enter the market itself, simultaneously claiming the right to a
monopoly.50 Entry by public agencies in this fashion undermines a
free market economy by removing essential incentives: a private com-
petitor's goals of developing a market and increasing market share for
profit.51 Furthermore, a market economy generally tolerates state-run
monopolies only when the private sector fails at a particular venture
or when the private sector is very inefficient at providing a particular
service.52 The private international courier industry was neither fail-
ing nor inefficient when the Bundespost initiated Datapost service.
These weaknesses in the February Agreement were perhaps antic-
ipated: the Agreement itself provided for the parties to meet in the
near future to establish a more permanent solution. 53 Nine months
later, the parties reformulated their positions in the November
Agreement.
C. THE NOVEMBER AGREEMENT
Like the February Agreement, the November Agreement consists
of letters exchanged between the Bundespost and the couriers.54
49. See supra notes 26, 41.
50. See generally Breit & Breuel, Lockerung des Postmonopols?, 31 WIRTSCHAFT UND
WETrBEWERB 93, 97 (1981) (a debate on relaxing the postal monopoly restrictions).
51. For a discussion on business incentives in the international setting, see S. ROBOCK,
K. SIMMONDS & 1. ZWICK, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES 399-426 (1977).
52. Inefficiency in the private sector characterizes a "natural monopoly." A natural
monopoly is a monopoly that exhibits "an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs over
the entire extent of the market." 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND INsTrrTUTIONS 119 (1971). In other words, industries which require large invest-
ments of capital in order to operate at a minimum level produce more efficiently if operated
and regulated by a single entity. The electric utility industry is an example of this concept.
The courier industry, however, is labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive; no large
investment in plant or equipment is necessary to begin service. The telecommunications
industry has characteristics of both: it does not require the huge generating plants that are
associated with the electric utility industry, but it does require some investment in equip-
ment. The concept of a natural monopoly, then, may offer a policy reason for adopting a
broader monopoly concept with respect to telecommunications while maintaining a narrow
interpretation for the postal service vis-A-vis the couriers. See infra notes 154-58 and
accompanying text.
53. See infra note 97.
54. The couriers' letter to the Bundespost states, in relevant part:
The participants of the meeting [between the couriers and Bundespost] were all of
the understanding that the operation of international couriers does not fall within
the realm of letter delivery in the normal mass distributions of the Bundespost, but
[Vol. 19:35
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Although the letters are not legally binding, they represent significant
changes from the February Agreement and are more permanent in
character. 55
The November Agreement establishes the new status quo with
four substantial modifications of the parties' relationships. First, the
Bundespost acknowledges that "true" private international couriers,
as defined by the Agreement, are not subject to the postal monopoly. 56
In other words, the November Agreement limits the scope of the
Bundespost's monopoly to standard mail service. This determination
also recognizes a clear distinction between courier services and the
Bundespost's mail service. Second, the Agreement unambiguously
places Datapost and private couriers in a competitive relationship,
without regard to Datapost's actual competitiveness.5 7  The
rather is specialized in especially fast and reliable door-to-door delivery. In con-
trast to the traditional mass distribution of postal items, courier messages are
transported across national boundaries under the supervision of one organization
and remain in the control of this organization. The fact that the [courier] organi-
zation uses one or more couriers working as a unit under one management con-
tract is of no consequence to courier status. The exclusive administrative control
of this organization over the courier message exists throughout the entire transpor-
tation route and allows the courier service-on the sender's demand-to route or
re-route a message accordingly. Control of the message is further secured through
the person of the accompanying courier, who will carry proof of every message in a
bill-of-lading type document. Moreover, the exclusive control over the message is
required as a matter of civil law (liability law).
[The couriers] assume with [the Bundespost] that international couriers who trans-
port communications in the manner described above, regardless of the contents of
those communications, are not subject to the postal monopoly set out in section 2
of the Postal Law. It was also agreed that Datapost and the international couriers
stand in a competitive relationship to one another and that a market-economy
competition with concern for the needs of the economy and consumer is desirable.
[The couriers] gladly agree to [the Bundespost's] suggestion that [the parties] meet
again in two to three years to discuss the progress made to that point with this
agreement. Should there be unexpected difficulty in limiting the scope of this
agreement which results in harm to the mass distributions of the Bundespost, the
development of additional criteria to the present agreement will be required.
Letter of BIK to Bundesminister ftir das Post- und Fernmeldewesen (Nov. 30, 1984) [here-
inafter cited as Couriers' Letter of Nov. 30, 1984]. The Bundespost's reply to the Couriers'
Letter reiterated and emphasized the critical points as follows:
[T]he agreement applies only to international correspondence.... The Bundespost
must enforce its postal monopoly whenever the limited criteria for a true courier
service, as worked out . . . , are not met. The criteria are: transportation of
messages from door-to-door by couriers who continuously accompany the sepa-
rately traceable messages and, where required, possess individual authorization for
the given route and for the means of transportation.
Bundespost Letter of Dec. 18, 1984.
55. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 54. The exemption appears to be under section 2 of the Postal Law.
See supra note 2.
57. This is a significant departure from the February Agreement, which allowed pri-
vate international couriers to compete with Datapost only where Datapost was "as fast and
reliable." See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Bundespost recognizes that "market-economy competition with a con-
cern for the needs of the economy and consumer is desirable."58
Third, the Agreement provides mechanisms to ensure that the
Bundespost and private international courier services remain dis-
tinct.5 9 Couriers are required to carry proof that each message is of
the type excluded from the Bundespost's monopoly.60 This provision
ensures the Bundespost that couriers will not compete with standard
mail service and thus protects the scope of the national postal monop-
oly.61 Finally, the November Agreement suggests that the parties
meet whenever difficulties arise under the Agreement, or, as a matter
of course, in two to three years. This provision reflects a cooperative
attitude as well as both parties' desire for a stable relationship.
II. LEGAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING THE SCOPE OF THE
POSTAL MONOPOLY
The November Agreement establishes a viable relationship
between the Bundespost, Datapost, and the couriers. The newly
defined status quo must be measured against West German law and
relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome, which governs West Ger-
many as a member of the European Economic Community.
A. WEST GERMAN LAW
The operation of the postal monopoly in West Germany derives
from three separate sources of law: the Constitution, the Postal Law,
and the Postal Administrative Law. Although these sources neither
separately nor as a unit clearly define the scope of the postal monop-
oly, they do provide guidelines for analysis.
The West German Constitution is the primary source of author-
ity for the federal government's monopoly. Article 73(7) of the Con-
stitution reserves to the government the exclusive power to legislate in
58. Couriers' Letter of Nov. 30, 1984, supra note 54.
59. The Agreement establishes criteria for ensuring that private international couriers
perform only true courier services. The criteria are: "[1] transportation of messages from
door-to-door by couriers who continuously accompany the separately traceable messages
and... [2] where required, possess individual authorization for the given route and for the
means of transportation." Bundespost Letter of Dec. 18, 1984, supra note 54.
60. "Control of the message is further secured through the person of the accompanying
courier, who will carry proof of every message in a bill-of-lading type document." Couri-
ers' Letter of Nov. 30, 1984, supra note 54.
61. This result depends on the Bundespost's ability to restrict the private couriers to
true courier service through the agreed-upon criteria. See supra note 59. Other systems
that depend on compliance with similar definitions have become problematic. Compare the
USPS' "extremely urgent" exception, supra note 20 (the content-based exception has
proven difficult to enforce, with the result that many business entitities, merely for the sake
of convenience, send items by courier that do not satisfy the "extremely urgent" definition).
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matters of postal and telecommunications services. 62 The Constitu-
tion also establishes the Bundespost as an agency of the federal admin-
istration with its own administrative substructure. 63
The second source relevant to the scope of the monopoly is sec-
tion 2 of the Postal Law. This provision grants to the Bundespost the
exclusive power to establish and operate facilities for the commercial
forwarding of shipments containing written correspondence or other
communications from person to person. 64 Section 2, however, pro-
vides no additional information on the scope of the monopoly; there-
fore, defining the scope becomes problematic as the Bundespost
improves old services and introduces new ones.
In addition to the Constitution and the Postal Law, the Postal
Administrative Law65 governs the internal operations of the
Bundespost. Section 15 of this statute requires the Bundespost to
operate on a balanced budget.66 This obligation requires the
Bundespost to cross-subsidize non-profitable routes with revenues
from profitable routes.67 The requirement that the Bundespost oper-
ate on a balanced budget supports the corollary right to protect reve-
nue-producing routes through a monopoly.68
B. THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
In 1958, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic
Community. 69 The Treaty set out the legal framework necessary to
promote economic growth and harmony among the Member States of
62. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 73(7) (W. Ger.).
63. "[T]he federal postal service... shall be conducted as [a] matter of direct federal
administration with [its] own administrative substructure .... GG art. 87. It is the
particular function of an administrative monopoly (such as the postal monopoly) to further
a specific administrative purpose. P. BADURA, supra note 10, at 90. The special adminis-
trative purpose of the Bundespost is to organize the unified and fair distribution of written
messages throughout West Germany. Id. at 199.
64. PostG § 2.
65. Postverwaltungsgesetz [PVerwG], 1953 BGB1 1 676 (W. Ger.) (Postal Administra-
tive Law).
66. "The German Bundespost must establish and enforce its budget in such a way that
it can defray the costs necessary to fulfill its tasks and duties from the Bundespost's own
income. Subsidies from the federal treasury will not be allowed." Id. § 15(1).
67. See Leithiuser, Das Leistungsprinzip in der Verwaltung und Leistungssteigerung bei
der DBP, 25 JAHRBUCH DES POSTWESENS 137 (1975), summary in English at 394.
68. See Altmannsperger, Ursprung und Entwicklung der staatlichen Alleinrechte auf
dem Gebiet des Postwesens, 19 JAHRBUCH DES PosTwEsENs 236 (1969) (Origin and Devel-
opment of Exclusive State Control over the Postal Service). Altmannsperger recognizes
that a monopoly is necessary to ensure to the Bundespost sufficient means to carry out its
functions. Altmannsperger suggests, however, that in light of the Bundespost's public ser-
vice function, the Bundespost's objective should not necessarily be to make a large profit.
Id. at 237-38.
69. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]. Article 2 establishes the general objec-
tives of the Community. See infra text accompanying note 77.
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the newly formed Community.70 To attain these objectives, the Treaty
empowered the Community organs with the authority to bind Mem-
ber States through a variety of legal measures, most often directives or
regulations. 71 The law of the EEC therefore not only binds Member
States, but supersedes inconsistent provisions of national law.72
As a Member State of the EEC, West Germany is bound by the
Treaty as well as by directives and regulations issued pursuant to the
Treaty. As part of the federal government of West Germany, the
Bundespost is also subject to all binding EEC measures and must com-
port with the law and objectives of the EEC.73
The European Commission is the organ of the Community
responsible for ensuring that Member States comply with specific pro-
visions and policies of the Treaty of Rome.7 4 To fulfill its watch-dog
function, the Treaty of Rome empowers the Commission to conduct
investigations.75 If the Commission determines that there has been a
70. "The task entrusted to the Community shall be carried out by... an Assembly, a
Council, a Commission, [and] a Court of Justice. Each institution shall act within the
powers conferred upon it by the Treaty." Treaty of Rome, art. 4.
71. In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives,
take decisions, make recommendations, or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety
and directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice
of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
Id., art. 189. See also P. MATHUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 183-89
(1975).
72. See generally A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, E.E.C. LAW 87-92 (1981). See, e.g., N.V.
Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
Tariefcommissie, 1963 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 7, reported in English, 2 Common Mkt. L.R.
105, 129 (Case 26/62) (the Community creates a new legal order imposing obligations on
individuals as well as rights to be protected in national courts); Wilhelm v. Bundeskar-
tellamt, 1969 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1, reported in English, 8 Common Mkt. L.R. 100, 119
(Case 14/68) (conflicts between the Community rule and national rules on competition
should be resolved by applying the principle of primacy to the Community rule); Amminis-
trazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629,
643 (Case 106/77) (principle of precedence of Community law automatically renders inap-
plicable any conflicting provision of national law and precludes adoption of any new
national legislation inconsistent with Community provisions).
73. This is evidenced by the Commission's investigation into the Bundespost's postal
monopoly. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 71.
75. Treaty of Rome, art. 213. The article also provides that the European Council may
establish limits and conditions on information gathering. In addition to formal inquiry
under article 213, matters may also come to the Commission's attention "through com-
plaints from Member States, by way of written question from the European Parliament,
and by way of complaints of individuals." A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, supra note 72, at 19
(footnotes omitted). It may also be assumed that the members of the Commission take
notice of potential violations that they themselves observe.
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breach of the Treaty,
[t]he usual procedure by which the Commission takes action against a Member
State is contained in Article 169, providing for the issue of a reasoned opinion
on the matter; in the event of non-compliance, the matter can be brought
before the Court of Justice. Often, however, threat of proceedings will have the
desired effect, or else the action may be dropped at the opinion stage or even
later.7
6
Four provisions of the Treaty of Rome pertain to the scope of monop-
olies and, therefore, to the November Agreement.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rome establish the Community's
objectives and provide means to achieve those objectives. Member
States and their agencies, such as the Bundespost, must not adopt pro-
visions incompatible with articles 2 and 3. Article 2 provides in full:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the
States belonging to it.7
7
Therefore, under article 2, the status quo achieved under the Novem-
ber Agreement must be consistent with other Member States' laws and
should allow opportunity for economic growth.
Article 3 establishes the means to'achieve the objectives of article
2. Article 3 provides that "[flor the purposes set out in Article 2, the
activities of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty
the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent
required for the proper functioning of the Common Market ....
76. A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, supra note 72, at 19 (footnote omitted). Article 169
reads, in full:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation
under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the
State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
Treaty of Rome, art. 169.
77. Id., art. 2.
78. Id., art. 3(h). The Court of Justice of the European Community (E.C.J.) has stated
that the basic provisions of the Treaty of Rome apply to the "whole complex of economic
activity." Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, 1974 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 359, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216, 228 (para. 21) (Case 167/73) (French law that
required certain percentage of crew on French vessels to be French citizens was found to be
within the "whole sphere of economic activity;" the Court of Justice held that failure to
rescind the law violated the mandate to approximate).
The Treaty of Rome does not purport to regulate the economic activity of national postal
services as long as the effects of such activity are confined within the nation's borders. The
source of the European Commission's concern with respect to international couriers, how-
ever, was that a restriction on the growth of courier companies would have an adverse
effect on the growth and integration of the European Community. See 18 BULL. E.C. 21
(pt. 1 1985).
50 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:35
The term "approximation" does not require the surrender of
national functions to the European Community. Rather, the term
"refer[s] to activities designed to make national rules or policies more
consistent with each other, and to some extent, more consistent with
the general purposes of the Treaty... ." -79 The Treaty does not intrude
on activities wholly within a Member State's borders; it does, however,
impose an obligation on Member States to strive for a certain degree of
uniformity with respect to activities which have effects throughout the
Community.80 Commentators have specifically pointed to postal and
telecommunications services as a field appropriately subject to approx-
imation requirements.8"
Article 86 is the third provision of the Treaty of Rome relevant to
the scope of the West German postal monopoly.8 2 As part of the
Community's competition policy established in articles 84 through
94,83 article 86 is of particular significance with respect to monopolies:
it forbids the abuse of a dominant position within the European Com-
munity. 84 An entity violates article 86 if (1) it is an undertaking; (2) it
abuses a dominant position; and (3) the abuse adversely affects trade
between Member States.8 5
The fourth provision of the Treaty of Rome that bears on the
November Agreement and the Bundespost's monopoly is article 90,
also part of the Community's competition policy.86 Article 90 specifi-
79. 1 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
18 (1984). As the commentary points out, problems arising from interpretation of article 2
have been more political and practical than definitional and legal. "[The problems of inter-
pretation] are related to the reluctance of many Member States to adjust their economic
policies... in certain instances to the needs of the Member States as a whole." Id. at 18.
80. Treaty of Rome, art. 3(h).
81. 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 3302.35 (1985). Although the couriers never con-
ceded that their services were within the Bundespost's competence, couriers clearly serve a
communicative function that would advance integration of the European Community.
82. Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States,
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other par-
ties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commer-
cial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Treaty of Rome, art. 86.
83. See generally A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, supra note 72, at 312-42.
84. See supra note 82.
85. See id.
86. 1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member
States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COURIERS
cally extends the general principles of the Treaty of Rome to "public
undertakings"'8 7 and "undertaking[s] to which Member States grant
special or exclusive rights."88 Article 90 furthers a policy that pre-
vents a Member State from achieving advantages through its agencies
that the Treaty otherwise forbids.89
If an entity is a public undertaking, or an undertaking with spe-
cial or exclusive rights, article 90(1) prohibits the enactment or main-
tenance by a Member State of any measures that are inconsistent with
the Treaty of Rome.90 The inconsistency requirement implies that
article 90 does not prohibit government monopolies per se; "[t]he
EEC Treaty prohibits the Member States neither from denationalizing
public enterprises nor from nationalizing private enterprise." 91
Monopolies are tolerated, however, only to the extent that they do not
interfere with the development of trade.92
The scope of the postal monopoly is therefore limited by West
German law and articles 2, 3, 86, and 90 of the Treaty of Rome. This
Note will analyze the November Agreement in light of those
limitations.
III. ANALYSIS
I
A. THE NON-BINDING CHARACTER OF THE NOVEMBER
AGREEMENT
The November Agreement does not technically create binding
legal obligations between any of the parties. Although the
Bundespost, as a federal administrative agency, possesses derivative
law-making competence, 93 new law cannot be created without adher-
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in
particular to those rules provided for in Articles 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject
to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to
them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would
be contrary to the interest of the Community.
Treaty of Rome, art. 90(1)-(2). See generally Schindler, Public Enterprises and the E.E.C
Treaty, 7 COMM. MKT. L. Rlv. 57 (1970).
87. See supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. See 3 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 79, at 344 (Court of Justice will construe
article 90 broadly to prevent Member States from achieving what the Treaty prohibits).
90. See supra note 86.
91. Schindler, supra note 86, at 58.
92. Treaty of Rome, art. 90(2).
93. See generally W. FRIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 34-37 (sources of German law); G.
K6BLER, supra note 9, at 252-61 (public law).
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ence to minimum formalities. 94 The mere exchange of letters, like the
exchanges that resulted in the February and November Agreements,
fails to satisfy the formal requirements of new legislation and thus has
no binding force.
The November Agreement, nevertheless, has the practical effect
of providing certainty to the couriers. The February Agreement had
created uncertainty by suggesting that an improved Datapost service
would curtail and gradually eliminate the private couriers' right to
operate.95 The November Agreement, by contrast, defines a "true
courier" and guarantees such a courier's right to operate. 96 The non-
binding November Agreement thus clarifies the relationship of the
couriers to the Bundespost and Datapost.
Despite the non-binding character of the November Agreement,
at least two factors suggest the Agreement will prove to be durable.
First, the Bundespost and the couriers reached the February Agree-
ment in contemplation of further negotiations.97 The November
Agreement is therefore a direct outgrowth of expectations recognized
during the negotiation of the February Agreement. Second, the par-
ties have had sufficient time to investigate and address all the legal
issues. In addition to the unambiguous language of the November
Agreement, these factors suggest that the Agreement is more than a
short-term solution.
B. THE EFFECT OF THE NOVEMBER AGREEMENT AND WEST
GERMAN LAW
The status quo achieved by the November Agreement is consis-
tent with West German constitutional and legislative provisions.
Article 73(7) of the West German Constitution grants the federal gov-
eminent exclusive power to provide both postal and telecommunica-
tions services. 98 Section 2 of the Postal Law shapes this broad grant of
power by defining terms and authorizing the Bundesminister for
Postal and Telecommunications to grant exemptions from the postal
94. W. FRIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 34 (formality is required in order to impress the
force of law on the conscience of society); see also GG art. 80 (issuance of ordinances
having the force of law).
95. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (the Bundespost will not enforce the
postal monopoly where it cannot provide service that is as fast and as reliable as the couri-
ers' service).
96. See supra note 54.
97. The parties concluded the February Agreement with three conditions: (1) the
Bundespost and the couriers would continue to negotiate in good faith to reach a workable
solution; (2) neither side would contemplate a "surprise" legal attack in the courts as long
as negotiations continued; and (3) if either side did contemplate legal action, it would pro-
vide reasonable notice to the other side. Interview with Johann-Andreas Rossbach, Ross-
bach & Kirchner (Frankfurt, West Germany), June 4, 1984.
98. GG art. 73(7) (W. Ger.).
[Vol. 19:35
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COURIERS
monopoly. 99 Thus, the exemption for private international couriers
provided in the November Agreement is a proper exercise of the
Bundesminister's authority.
Analysis of the November Agreement under the postal adminis-
trative regulations is more complex. Section 15 of the Postal Adminis-
trative Law requires the Bundespost to operate on a balanced
budget.100 The Bundespost, however, also has an obligation to provide
all citizens with standard mail service.101 These two obligations create
a conflict for the Bundespost, which cannot operate all routes at a
profit.102 Generally, the Bundespost must cross-subsidize the cost of
delivery to small-scale users and rural dwellers with profits from
routes having lower transportation costs and higher volume.10 3 The
couriers, by contrast, have no obligation to provide service to all citi-
zens and may therefore confine their operations to profitable, high-
volume routes.
The Bundespost has argued that its obligation to provide all citi-
zens with mail service, along with the balanced-budget requirement,
leaves the Bundespost especially susceptible to "cream-skimming" by
private international couriers. Cream-skimming would rob the postal
service of business on its most lucrative routes, forcing the Bundespost
to continue rural deliveries without the economic means to do so.1°4
If the Bundespost and the couriers offered identical services, the
cream-skimming argument might be persuasive. The November
Agreement avoids this argument, however, by distinguishing private
international courier service from standard mail service.10 5 As one
study has concluded, postal services are most susceptible to cream-
skimming on local routes that have a high volume of business transac-
tions.106 Local ventures, the study found, would be easy to launch
(little sorting required; limited delivery area) and would have a high
profit potential. 107
99. See supra note 2.
100. See supra note 66.
101. See supra notes 18, 63.
102. See Leithiuser, supra note 67.
103. Id.
104. See Altmannsperger, supra note 68. Cream-skimming was also a problem in the
United States. See generally BOARD OF GovERNoRS REP., supra note 17.
105. See supra note 54 (the Agreement specifies that "the operation of international cou-
riers does not fall within the realm of letter delivery in the normal mass distribution of the
Bundespost. . . ." (emphasis added)). See also supra note 60 (couriers required to carry
proof documenting their courier status).
106. BOARD OF GOVERNORS REP., supra note 17, at 119. This study did not cite couri-
ers as potential cream-skimmers, although it acknowledged couriers as a source of competi-
tion. Id. at 83-86.
107. Id. at 127-28.
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Private international couriers do not posses the characteristics
that would make a local venture a potential cream-skimmer. Rather
than simplified delivery systems, couriers must organize intricate net-
works of pick-up and delivery points. Coordination between messen-
gers and management must be precise. Private international couriers
must arrange overseas flight schedules and plan for possible delays.' 08
Finally, instead of offering their customers savings, private interna-
tional couriers charge substantially higher fees for their service
because it guarantees greater speed and reliability.10 9
Because the November Agreement exempts only private interna-
tional couriers from the postal monopoly and because these couriers
do not threaten profitable standard mail routes, 10 the November
Agreement produces a status quo that is consistent with the
Bundespost's balanced-budget requirement.
C. THE EFFEcT OF THE NOVEMBER AGREEMENT AND EEC LAW
The status quo established under the November Agreement takes
on added significance in light of concerns expressed by the European
108. Especially in the early stages of operation, private couriers often rely on commer-
cial airlines. The more profitable companies may eventually purchase their own aircraft to
increase efficiency. See, ag., Federal Express Service Guide, supra note 31.
109. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
110. In addition to the suggestion that private international couriers do not represent a
cream-skimming threat, there is also no evidence that couriers have created financial hard-
ship for the Bundespost and Datapost. The Statistical Abstract for West Germany does
not include specific figures for Datapost. Figures for the Bundespost as a whole over the
past eight years, however, show that although total profits have decreased, returns from
postal operations have steadily increased. STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, STATISTISCHES
JAHR13UCH FOR 1984 FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 310 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH] (and previous volumes). In particular, the number of
registered mail items and small packages (those items which, rather than postal letters, a
private courier would carry), has remained fairly stable; registered mail items have shown a
slight increase. Id. at 527. Thus, although the Bundespost has seen a decrease in profits,
the increase in volume of items handled suggests that the couriers may not have skimmed
the cream off the Bundespost's most lucrative business.
Some countries facing actual lost revenue impose a fee on couriers as a compromise
solution to the problem. See supra note 47. While such a solution is realistically possible, it
is theoretically inconsistent for the postal service, which can operate only at the domestic
level (or in cooperation with foreign postal services), to impose a lost revenue fee on inter-
national couriers who, the postal service claims, have no authority to operate within the
country. The postal service, in effect, is taking a lost revenue fee from an operation that it
claims is illegal. Moreover, the lost revenue fee solution begs the more fundamental ques-
tion of why private-sector providers of an international service should be required to subsi-
dize a domestic service. It is perhaps helpful to analogize to the health care industry, where
those who wish to receive more personalized and thorough care may choose to enter a
private hospital and incur considerably higher rates. Such hospitals are not asked to subsi-
dize government-supported hospitals that provide less specialized service, even though pri-
vate hospitals clearly take away business that would otherwise go to the general hospitals.
Likewise, private international couriers provide a more specialized service for a higher fee,
and it is not clear why the couriers should be required to share that profit as a subsidy to a
government service.
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Commission that the Bundespost's prior position conflicted with EEC
law.1  The Commission became involved in the controversy between
the Bundespost and the couriers in October of 1984, when it requested
that the Bundespost answer a number of written questions. 112 At the
time of the Commission's request, the parties were preparing to meet
on November 27, 1984. Apparently satisfied with the November
Agreement, the Commission closed its investigation without taking
action before the European Court of Justice. 113
Although the Commission's investigation did not result in a bind-
ing regulation, directive, or decision, the Commission did issue an
opinion 14 establishing its position: "[The Commission] regards the
Member States' postal and telecommunications authorities as com-
mercial undertakings, since they supply goods and services for pay-
ment, and ... any extension by one or more of these undertakings of
their dominant positions may constitute an abuse under Article 86 of
the EEC Treaty." 115
111. The Commission was concerned that the Bundespost might expand its postal
monopoly to eliminate private courier service in West Germany. The Commission's official
report states that "[t]his [elimination] would have been particularly regrettable as the cou-
rier companies are extremely important for the growth and integration of the European
economy." 18 BULL. E.C. 21 (pt. 1 1985) (official summary of Commission's activity).
The report continues: "An extention of the Bundespost's postal monopoly would also have
paralysed the extensive network of courier services that has grown up with other Member
States, although the postal authorities in these countries do not claim a monopoly for cou-
rier services." Id.
112. Telephone interview with Library Staff Member, United States Information Service
for the European Economic Communities (Oct. 25, 1985).
113. 18 BULL. E.C. 21 (pt. 1 1985). The report summarizes the effect of the
investigation:
After the Commission expressed concern about [expansion of the Bundespost's
monopoly to exclude the couriers], on the basis of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty,
the Bundespost agreed to accept competition from private courier companies in the
Federal Republic. It has recognized that courier services differ from the services
provided by a postal authority in that consignments carried by a courier company
are under constant supervision throughout the journey from the consignor to the
consignee, are at all times individually identifiable and can be diverted en route to
another destination or consignee. National postal authorities cannot provide such
a service since they have to hand over consignments at the border to another postal
authority, so that they cannot guarantee constant supervision, identifiability and
possibility of diversion of the consignment. The Bundespost has also given assur-
ances that it does not intend to penetrate the market by charging below cost for its
own express delivery services.
The Commission has therefore been able to close its investigations into this case.
The Commission could have taken action under article 169 of the Treaty of Rome. See
supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
114. As an opinion, the Commission's statement has no legal force. See supra note 71
(recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force) (quoting article 189 of the
Treaty of Rome).
115. 18 BULL. E.C. 21 (pt. 1 1985). The opinion is significant for analysis of the
November Agreement under articles 86 and 90 of the Treaty of Rome. See infra notes 119-
46 and accompanying text.
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Before analyzing the Commission's opinion, it is important to
note that the status quo established under the November Agreement is
consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Rome set out in article
2. The objective of harmonious development of economic activities
between Member States is, in fact, furthered by the Agreement: pri-
vate international couriers are allowed to develop in West Germany as
they have developed in other Common Market countries-without
government interference.' 16 Consistent treatment of couriers within
the EEC will help to establish better communication throughout the
EEC. In particular, consistent treatment of couriers will ensure that
businesses and private individuals in West Germany have access to the
same fast and reliable communication services that are available in
other EEC countries.11 7 Compliance with article 2 also satisfies article
3, because article 3 simply establishes the means to obtain the objec-
tives of article 2.118
In addition to satisfying articles 2 and 3, the November Agree-
ment establishes a status quo that is consistent with article 86. A vio-
lation of article 86 occurs when an undertaking abuses a dominant
position and the abuse adversely affects trade between Member
States. 119 The Commission opinion which followed the recent investi-
gation of the Bundespost stated that Member States' postal and tele-
communications authorities are commercial undertakings in dominant
positions. 120 Application of the Commission's opinion to West Ger-
many means that the Bundespost, under article 86, is an undertaking
in a dominant position. 121
Although the Commission's opinion is not binding, the
Bundespost would probably not challenge its characterization as an
undertaking, especially because West German law also recognizes the
116. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
U.S. have all expressly exempted private international couriers from their postal
monopolies.
117. See E. KAUFER, supra note 1, at 13. Kaufer argues that eliminating private inter-
national courier service would make West Germany less attractive to foreign investors.
If West Germany is not able to offer access to all possible communication systems
available in world trade, West Germany will lose its attractiveness as a target for
foreign investment as well as its competitiveness in offering high-technology prod-
ucts. Foreign direct investment requires fast and reliable communication between
mother- and daughter-corporations. If West Germany does not offer international
courier service, foreign direct investment will relocate in those countries which do
offer such courier services.
Id
118. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 82.
120. See supra text accompanying note 115.
121. See id.
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Bundespost as a public undertaking. 122 Similarly, the Commission's
opinion that the Bundespost occupies a dominant position is virtually
unassailable. Although "dominant position" has been accorded vari-
ous meanings in the past, 123 a 1982 Commission ruling suggests one
clear definition: an undertaking which enjoys a statutory monopoly
necessarily occupies a dominant position. 124 Under this definition, the
Bundespost occupies a dominant position by virtue of its statutory
postal monopoly.
The remaining requirement to find an article 86 violation is a
determination that the undertaking in a dominant position abuses its
position in a fashion adversely affecting trade between the Member
States. 125 Market domination alone is not the target of article 86; arti-
cle 86 regulates market domination only when such a position is
abused. Exact definitions of "abuse" have varied, 126 but, at a
122. German commentators have characterized the Bundespost as a public undertaking,
reflecting the Bundespost's restructuring in the 1970's to achieve a more business-like oper-
ation. Leithiuser, supra note 67. Prior to the Commission's investigation, the Court of
Justice of the European Communities had also indicated that it would construe the term
"undertaking" broadly in order to enforce the general principles of the Treaty of Rome.
See Ex parte Sacchi, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, 441, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177, 203
(Case 155/73) (Court rejected an argument by the Italian government that, because the
Italian television network performed a cultural and informational task in the public inter-
est, it should not be considered an "undertaking" for purposes of the Treaty). Finally,
"[t]he Treaty is satisfied only if the concept [of a public undertaking] covers every possible
participation in the market on the part of the State." Schindler, supra note 86, at 60.
123. See generally R. JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION
226-40 (1970). The concept has undergone subtle changes under EEC law, but the empha-
sis remains on preventing accumulations of power in an undertaking that are inconsistent
with the concept of an open, competitive market. See, eg., Sirena s.r.l. v. Eda s.r.l., 1971
C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 69, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 260 (Case 40/70); Deutsche Grammophon
GmbH v. Metro-SB Grossmgrkte GmbH, 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, 10 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 631 (Case 78/70) (dominant position is the power to prevent the maintenance of effec-
tive competition in a substantial part of the relevant market); Euremballage and Continen-
tal Can v. Commission, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (Case 6/
72) (subtle shift to focus on competition's ability to enter market rather than an undertak-
ing's power to exclude business); United Brands Company v. Commission, 1978 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 207, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429 (Case 27/76) (focus on ability to act indepen-
dently of competitors and consumers and thus to prevent effective competition).
124. Re British Telecommunications, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 369) 3640, para. 32
(1982) (official report of Commission decision). In British Telecommunications, the Com-
mission found that certain telex restrictions imposed by British Telecommunications (BT)
constituted an abuse of a dominant position under article 86. BT was a private corporation
that, in 1981, became the legal successor to a statutory monopoly for telecommunications
in the United Kingdom previously held by the United Kingdom Post Office. The Commis-
sion stated simply that "British Telecommunications has a statutory monopoly ... [and]
therefore holds a dominant position in the United Kingdom.. . ." Id. at para. 26. British
Telecommunications was the first case in which the Commission applied the EEC competi-
tion provisions to public enterprises. Comment, The British Telecommunications Decision:
Toward a New Telecommunications Policy in the Common Market, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J.
229 (1984).
125. See supra note 82.
126. Article 86 itself offers a non-definitive list of situations where abuse may occur. See
supra note 82. Article 86(b) suggests that restricting private courier operation would be an
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mininum, article 86 covers abuse affecting the position of competitors
and all other agents in the free market, as well as abuse affecting
consumers.127
Assuming that businesses require a fast, reliable delivery service
to operate efficiently, any interference with courier service by the
Bundespost may amount to abuse of a dominant position that
adversely affects trade. The November Agreement establishes a rela-
tionship that prevents the Bundespost from interfering with the couri-
ers' operations in this way. The Agreement may, in fact, serve to
diminish the Bundespost's dominant position by placing Datapost and
the couriers on equal footing. 128 Furthermore, consumers benefit
through competition created by the Agreement; Datapost has no
advantage by virtue of the Bundespost's statutory monopoly.1 29
Although the Bundespost is clearly an undertaking in a dominant
position, the Bundespost's status under the November Agreement
complies with article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
The foregoing analysis establishes that the new status quo under
the November Agreement is consistent with article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome; the analysis also suggests that the previous February Agree-
ment "adversely affected trade" and thus violated the Treaty. This
consideration is important-even though the Bundespost has not sug-
gested it would return to its previous position-because the November
Agreement is non-binding. 130
The February Agreement contemplated an expansion of the pos-
tal monopoly that would gradually have eliminated private interna-
tional courier service.' 31 Such an expansion would have restricted the
choice of services which customers otherwise enjoyed. 132 Restrictions
on couriers would also have disadvantaged West German couriers that
abuse insofar as it limited the "market" of courier services available to the consumer. In
L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, 3794, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235
(Case 31/80), the Court characterized abuse as "methods [that are] different from those
which condition normal competition on the basis of the transactions of traders, hinders the
maintenance or development of competition and may affect trade between Member States."
Thus, under the L'Oreal definition, restriction of private courier operation through an
extension of the postal monopoly would be an abuse because it would impose conditions on
the competitive market which are detrimental to the consumer.
127. 2 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 79, at 3-264. See Instituto Chemioterapico
Italiano and Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, 13
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309 (Cases 6-7/73) (article 86 prohibits abuses which directly prejudice
consumers as well as abuses which indirectly prejudice them by impairing the effective
competitive structure as envisaged by article 3(f) of the Treaty).
128. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
129. Datapost does, however, have non-legal advantages stemming from its relationship
with Bundespost. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
131. See supra text accompanying note 7.
132. Elimination of private international couriers would leave consumers with no ser-
vice other than Datapost. This Note maintains that the express service provided by a gov-
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desired to provide the same services as their competitors elsewhere in
the EEC. 133
Perhaps most offensively, interference with the couriers would
have stifled development produced through the competitive process.
The developments that followed the introduction of courier services
suggest that when a new service is allowed to develop on the open
market, innovation in other fields follows. Private airlines introduced
courier services.134 The West German Federal Railroad instituted
operation of an InterCity courier. 135 Most recently, a completely new
source of competition has emerged in the form of a "courier broker"
industry. Operating in a manner similar to travel agents, courier bro-
kers compare the various courier services and put together the most
efficient package for its customers.136 These developments, which
grew naturally from the operation of private international couriers,
would have been smothered under a strict interpretation of West Ger-
many's postal monopoly. Given the Commission's inclination to find
any detrimental effects on trade abusive, 137 the treatment of private
international couriers in the November Agreement is the only possible
interpretation of West Germany's postal monopoly consistent with
article 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
Compliance with article 86, however, does not complete the anal-
ysis of the effects of the November Agreement; the Agreement must
also be consistent with article 90 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 90
ensures that state-operated or state-granted monopolies do not enact
or maintain measures "contrary to the rules contained in this
Treaty.' 38  Similarly, "[t]he development of trade must not be
affected [by monopolies] to such an extent as would be contrary to the
interests of the Community."' 39
Commentators measure incompatibility with the Treaty in terms
ernment agency has significant administrative limitations and therefore constitutes a
different service than that provided by private couriers.
133. See supra note 117.
134. See, e.g., The Battle of the Overnights, Newsweek, Feb. 7, 1983, at 55, col. 2 (refers
to service provided by a major airline). The Yellow Pages for any major city indicate that
many commercial airlines have initiated courier service.
135. "InterCity" is the designation for express passenger trains which provide service
between designated major cities. In West Germany, the federal railroad system
(Bundesbahn) runs InterCity, accepting and delivering express documents in cities along its
route.
136. See, e.g., Federal Express Service Guide, supra note 31. Federal Express has insti-
tuted a Referral Service to cover countries in which it has not yet established operations.
137. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 86.
139. See id.
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of effect on trade.140 An agreement is incompatible with the Treaty if
it could possibly hinder the attainment of a single market among
Member States. Incompatibility is deemed to exist if it can be inferred
"with a sufficient degree of probability that the agreement is directly
or indirectly, actually or potentially capable of influencing trade."' 14
In applying this standard, the Court of Justice has indicated a willing-
ness to interpret "effect on trade" broadly: the phrase includes an
agreement that might possibly influence a pattern of trade so as to
hinder the EEC's attainment of a single market.142 The Court of Jus-
tice has also held that an "effect on trade" exists even if the obstructed
access to the market is confined to a single state, as long as the
obstruction "is capable of affecting patterns of trade and competition
in the Common Market."' 143
The central concern of article 90, as evidenced by the Court of
Justice opinions, is to prohibit undertakings with special or exclusive
rights from preventing the realization of a single market between
Member States. The Bundespost, prior to the November Agreement,
had the exclusive right under the postal monopoly to deliver all writ-
ten communitations. 144 The Commission's investigation into the
monopoly's relationship to private couriers indicated a possible viola-
tion of article 90: the Commission specifically noted that further
expansion of the Bundespost's monopoly would have obstructed
attainment of a single market.145
Again, the Commission's opinion suggests that the February
Agreement violated the Treaty of Rome, but that the November
Agreement produces a status quo consistent with the Treaty. At least
two facts support this conclusion. First, the November Agreement
effectively creates and guarantees a new market for the couriers in
West Germany; it therefore promotes realization of a single market by
140. See Basic Competition Rules, 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2011-03 (discussing
Treaty of Rome, arts. 85, 86); see generally 2 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 79, at 350-
52.
141. Basic Competition Rules, supra note 140.
142. Salonia v. Poidomani, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1563, COMM. MKT. REP.(CCH)
8758 (Case 126/80). In Salonia, the E.C.J. held that an agreement providing for exclu-
sive distribution of national products in the territory of a Member State-specifically, dis-
tribution of Italian newspapers and periodicals in Italy--'may have the effect of reinforcing
the partitioning of the market on a national basis, thereby impeding the economic interpen-
etration which the Treaty is designed to bring about." 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1578.
143. N.V. Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 3461, 3522, para. 103 (Case 322/81). Thus, if the E.C.J. did find incompatibil-
ity with the EEC Treaty in the Bundespost's interpretation of the postal monopoly, the
E.C.J. could issue a directive compelling West Germany to resolve the incompatability,
Treaty of Rome, art. 90(3), even though the Bundespost's interpretation would only affect
the operation of private couriers in West Germany.
144. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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allowing private enterprise to penetrate the market. 146 Second, the
termination of the Commission's investigation is some evidence of
minimal compliance with Treaty provisions, including article 90.
D. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE NOVEMBER
AGREEMENT
The November Agreement eliminates several grounds for poten-
tial conflict and establishes a working relationship between the couri-
ers and the Bundespost. The Agreement, however, also creates
uncertainty with respect to two issues likely to arise in the future:
Datapost's ability to compete with couriers and the applicability of the
November Agreement to the telecommunications industry.
L The Future of Datapost
The November Agreement expressly provides that Datapost and
the couriers will compete with one another.147 The European Com-
mission's report further elaborated that "[t]he Bundespost has also
given assurances that it does not intend to penetrate the market by
charging below cost for its own express delivery service."' 148 The guar-
antee of competition will be meaningless, however, if Datapost is
unable to provide a service with enough "true courier" characteristics
to satisfy consumer needs. As a service of the federal government,
Datapost does not have the same operational flexibility as private
international couriers. Datapost therefore has an inherent disadvan-
tage in competing with the couriers for international business.
The Bundespost's agreement to compete with private interna-
tional couriers, however, does not necessarily sound the death knell
for Datapost. The Bundespost enjoys a long tradition of competence
in mail delivery, 149 and consumers who are used to having the
Bundespost provide general mail service may, out of habit, select
Datapost when the need for express service arises. As a government
agency, the Bundespost has a certain degree of natural visibility which
should also benefit Datapost. 50
Moreover, even the couriers do not dispute that Datapost can
offer an express service along with the Bundespost's general mail ser-
vice. The Bundespost is free to enter into agreements with other
146. Compare the effect of the February Agreement. See supra notes 42-53.
147. Couriers' Letter of Nov. 30, 1984, supra note 54.
148. 18 BULL. E.C. 21 (pt. 1 1985). See also supra text accompanying note 115.
149. See supra notes 13-18.
150. Whatever efficiency problems the Bundespost may have experienced, see generally
Leithiiuser, supra note 67, the Bundespost's record as provider of standard mail services
cannot be overlooked.
1986]
62 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
nations to provide a cooperative express service.151 International
express mail agreements may prove necessary to make Datapost more
competitive, even though such agreements cannot eliminate entirely
the inherent bureaucratic inefficiencies that delay delivery. Not all
consumers, however, will be concerned about the delays inherent in a
cooperative system, and Datapost may compete very well by servicing
those consumers for whom "time sensitive" means a matter of weeks
rather than days.
Datapost is more likely to survive as a competitor under the
November Agreement if the monopoly exemption continues to be nar-
rowly confined to "true couriers."1 52 A broad interpretation of the
exemption might allow private international couriers to creep into the
market for domestic express mail service. Such encroachment would
have a negative financial impact on Datapost, which currently enjoys
the exclusive right to provide express mail service within West Ger-
many. Enforcement of the domestic express mail monopoly could
pose problems for the Bundespost since the Bundespost would be
required to detain suspected violators to determine whether they are
legitimate couriers. The November Agreement, however, anticipates
this problem by requiring couriers to carry proof of their courier sta-
tus. 153 In this way, the Agreement avoids a domestic enforcement
problem and allows Datapost an equal opportunity to earn a profit on
international routes.
2. Applicability of the November Agreement to the
Telecommunications Industry
The November Agreement provides an immediate solution to one
problem posed by modern technology under West Germany's postal
monopoly, namely, the status of private couriers operating across
national boundaries. The Agreement, however, does not address the
problems created by similar services that also operate across national
boundaries. In particular, the Agreement does not cover telecommu-
nications regulation. 54 Discussion of this issue might have been
expected because, in West Germany, the Bundespost administers both
151. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 59.
153. See supra note 60.
154. Telecommunications regulation has been the subject of much scholarly discussion.
See, eg., Markoski, Telecommunications Regulations as Barriers to the Transborder Flow of
Information, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287 (1981); Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Chal-
lenge of the New Information Technologies: A Teleinformatics Strategy for the 1980's, 14
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 237 (1981) (both articles were part of a symposium on teleinformatics
published in that journal).
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postal and telecommunications services. 155
"Telecommunications" encompasses a variety of services. Tradi-
tionally, the term has included telephone and telegraph services; 156
more recently, the term has become synonymous with telex and elec-
tronic facsimile transmissions.15 7 Whether the Bundespost's monop-
oly extends to such services must be addressed by the parties who may
again agree on a definition of the service provided.
The couriers are inclined to view telecommunications as insepara-
ble from their current services. A top executive of a major courier
company recently stated, "[I]nformation movement . . . has to
be a joint courier-communications company undertaking.' 158 The
Bundespost may be content to allow couriers to provide telecommuni-
cations services. At the same time, they may update Datapost to com-
pete in this new market. Regardless of the exact resolution of this
issue, the cooperation and clarity evidenced by the November Agree-
ment should enhance the parties' chances of obtaining an agreeable
accord on telecommunications services.
CONCLUSION
The November Agreement, although not legally binding, estab-
lishes a status quo between the Bundespost, Datapost, and private
international couriers that complies with both West German and EEC
law. The Agreement recognizes the couriers' right to operate in West
Germany and, at the same time, preserves the integrity of the national
postal monopoly over standard mail service. The Agreement, how-
ever, is relatively limited in its scope and duration. Therefore,
Datapost's actual competitiveness and survival, as well as the private
international couriers' right to offer telecommunication services,
remain uncertain. Although these issues are yet unanswered, the
November Agreement and the means employed to achieve it bode well
for the parties' prospects of reaching an agreeable resolution.
Barbara L. Krause
155. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The combined regulation of postal and
telecommunications services is common throughout the world, e.g., in Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Canada; the U.S. is an exception.
156. See, e.g., STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 1985, supra note 110, at 310 (Statistics for
Postal and Telecommunications).
157. See, e.g., An International Courier Takes on Federal Express, Business Week, May
9, 1983, at 56, col. 2 (describing the entrance of DHL Worldwide Courier Express Network
into the U.S. market). The article focuses on the international aspects of the courier's
service.
158. Id.
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